The Usual Suspects

The Darfur Conflict Repeats a History of Marginalization—and US Complicity

Rebels in Darfur, Sudan, have split into warring factions divided by ethnic tensions and territorial ambitions. (Michael Kamber for The New York Times / Turn Left)

Andrew Garib, Turn Left | Link | In May of 2000, a very special book appeared on the streets of Khartoum. Due to heavy media restrictions imposed by the authoritarian Sudanese government, the book was distributed carefully and quickly, appearing at the entrances of mosques for patrons to peruse as they left Friday prayers. The Black Book: Imbalance of Power and Wealth in Sudan, struck a special chord with the Sudanese people. It was an instant popular hit, which comes as no surprise to the people of Sudan, victims of decades of negligent and often brutal rule from its national governments.

In a short period of time The Black Book became one of the most talked about pieces of literature in the nation, its contents spread far and wide, beyond the reach of national censors, through word of mouth in daily conversation and liberal doses of photocopier ink. The reason for The Black Book’s popularity was no secret, as it presented a story that spoke to millions of Sudanese, especially those of marginalized areas who had in recent years fled persecution, poverty and pestilence to the center of Sudanese power and wealth, the city of Khartoum.

The story of The Black Book should be familiar to many Americans as well. Its Western Sudanese authors, including those representing the perpetually war-torn region of Darfur, accuse the central government of Sudan of hording power and resources for those of the Northern, traditionally Arab region of the country. Table after table, argument after argument, history after history, The Black Book outlines a list of concerns not only for Western Sudanese, but for all people of Sudan representing regions neglected and underrepresented by the central government since the nation’s independence from the rule of the British/Egyptian Condominium in 1956. But even beyond Sudan, the words of The Black Book ring true; its authors, known only as Seekers of Truth and Justice, dedicate the book

To those who filled themselves of haughtiness, arrogance and feeling of superiority, wishing to silence our Black Book or elsewhere replace it with their White Book.
To the Sudanese people who have endured oppression, injustice and tyranny.
To the majority of the Sudanese people who still suffer marginalization of power and wealth.

Americans can relate to the call for recognition of a marginalized segment of society: Thomas Paine made a similar call, and a war of Independence was fought over that very issue. But more pertinent is America’s complicity in an array of military, economic and political actions over the course of the past sixty years which have played on a very similar theme, but unfortunately to the detriment of the global power periphery. The two year old conflict and genocide in the Darfur region of Sudan at the hands of the racist Arab government in Khartoum is little different from the dozens of examples of American foreign intervention which, regardless of the US government’s intentions, have merely reinforced the underlying and problematic structures of power in the world’s most dangerous areas and have resulted in some of the most heinous crimes since the Second World War.

The Black Book’s analysis is among the most honest pieces of popular literature about the situation in Sudan to date. Unlike the western media and the Khartoum oppressors, Seekers of Truth and Justice conceptualize the ongoing conflicts in Sudan, including the 20+ year civil war between the North and the South, not necessarily as matters of race and religion, but as issues of center and periphery. The conflict between North and South has traditionally been represented as a war between radical Islam and religious minorities including Christians in the South. The Darfur conflict is cut along perceived albeit artificial racial lines, with and Arab core in Khartoum oppressing a Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa collection of ethnicities in Sudan’s west.

The Black Book’s vatic and prescient insight is that the Darfur conflict too is about center and periphery. For the people of Western Sudan, like the various ethnicities, religious groups and regions throughout Africa’s largest state, have been the neglected and often brutalized fringe of the Sudanese people as far as Khartoum has been concerned.

It has been the unfortunate case that when dealing with the situation in Sudan, the United States has dealt directly with Sudan’s Northern irresponsible leadership. Under the dictatorship of Jaafar Nimairi, Sudan received millions of dollars of military and economic aid under the redrawn Cold War lines of the Carter and Reagan administrations. Only when the reactionary Islamic government of Omar el-Bashir came to power in 1989 did the American government cease aid to Sudan and truly begin to lean towards the support of rebel movements. Certainly the motivations of US involvement in Sudan have changed over the years, but constant are her reluctance to take serious stands against genocidal violence perpetrated by an illegitimate government, and America’s soft, subtle diplomacy infrequently punctuated by real action, guided by wavering goals and questionable ideals. This is not the kind of United States foreign policy which we should accept, yet it is a policy towards Sudan that has not changed much in the past two decades.

Playing a leading role in the United States’ complicity in the Darfur violence is its tactical maneuvering on the world stage. There is strong pressure from within the American government, led by those such as Senators Corzine and Brownback, to take stronger action against the atrocities in Darfur. Certainly the neoconservative agenda calls for the democratization of rogue states who harbor terrorists and threaten the interests of our allies and human rights. Sudan is a paradigm example of the neocon target; in fact, it presents a more impressive case than that of Iraq in March of 2003.

What’s interesting about America’s attempts to reach a solution is just how many concessions, limitations, and apprehensions the United States and many of its allies require or express when negotiating for peace in Sudan. The situation now is much different than that of the Cold War; it seems that the goal of the United States might be to create peace and prosperity through a new deal between rebel groups and the central government, and to insist on reform within Sudan’s core of power towards democracy and open society.

This hasn’t been the case. In fact, the Bush administration has blocked attempts to press for full economic sanctions against the Sudanese government, had rejected calls for support of Southern independence or autonomy, has repealed the Sudan Peace Act of 1999 which authorized direct deliveries of food aid to rebel groups in the South, and has only until recently blocked the referral of Sudanese war criminals to the International Criminal Court. In pressing for a peace agreement between the North and South in January of this year, the US has left its attack on the Darfur genocide to paper edicts at the UN and hollow words from our Congress and Executive. The North-South agreement, it seems, has been the penultimate goal, to the essential sacrifice of the 350,000 Darfuri who have perished at the hands of a brutal Khartoum regime.

The Bush administration’s myopia is astonishing, but is not unexpected. The history of recent genocide is riddled with often impotent US interventions in order to cause the least disturbance in related but separate peace with dictatorial and murderous regimes. The prime examples are Kosovo and Rwanda, where violence was ignored and tolerated (in Rwanda’s case, until the very end) ironically for the sakes of tenuous peace agreements.

This isn’t prudent diplomacy. It’s an undeserved recognition of the power structure of these rogue states, a validation of relations with core oppressive groups that wish more than anything else that the Western powers ignore their atrocities, or worse, acknowledge them and do nothing. The doctrine seems to be “peace at any cost”—that is, peace at the price of even worse violence in a neighboring region that neither Khartoum nor perhaps even the Americans care the least about. While the powers applaud their own efforts at establishing peace at what was once the central conflict, rogue governments continue to proceed with their main project of genocide.

Recent equivocation of the American government has not helped; the Bush administration’s recognition of genocide in Darfur is correct to the letter of the law, but as Alex de Waal points out, will have little effect on the actual turn of events in Darfur and will only expand the possibilities of intervention, at least rhetorically, for the hawks in Washington. The war in Iraq has become the center of a Khartoum counterattack in the world media, with Sudan, perhaps correctly, accusing the US of the worst hypocrisy.

If Americans find that the prevention and halting of genocide is a cause worthy of their attention and efforts, then the US government must act to both support peace and undermine and criticize the illegitimate and dictatorial governments that carry it out. The core of the Darfur disease is the cancer in Khartoum. It is the responsibility of ethical governments of the West to support the African Union and apply pressure to increase its mandate of protection of civilians. A UN peacekeeping force in Southern Sudan is only part of the process towards peace and stability; Western powers must continue to press for democracy and open society in Sudan, if not for democracy’s sake, then for our commitment to the sanctity of human life and the recognition of genocide as the worst crime humanity has conceived.

Due to its recent history, Sudan meets the new Millennium steeped in poverty, illiteracy, disease and lack of development. Despite [this], the Sudanese citizens are invited to rise to the challenge by appropriating the same powers which have so far crippled them. Let them do that in collaboration with other global citizens whose rulers have delivered and have prepared them for the new area.

Sources:
http://www.sakanab.wtcsites.com/black_book.htm
http://www.indexonline.org/en/news/articles/2005/1/sudan-defining-genocide.shtml
http://www.sudanjem.com/english/english.html
Johnson, Douglas H., The Root of Sudan’s Civil Wars. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004. End.